Ultimately, all military operations function on information. This requires an active thought process to protect the needed information and information systems as well as to exploit adversaries' information requirements. The sister services have pursued approaches in developing and resourcing Information Operations based upon their tactical requirements.
I. Introduction
The predominate problem of the US Military is to compel and deter those who would oppose the will of the US and if unsuccessful, render them incapable of physical resistance.
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The Gulf War has been heralded by some as the first Without the ability to coordinate, achieve or synchronize actions and effects, military power is subjected to degradation and is less than the sum of its parts. This is the foundation of command and control warfare.
Information is also critical to forming perceptions.
Perception is defined as "the act or faculty of apprehending by means of the senses or of the mind; cognition; understanding". 
III. Current State of Information Operations Doctrine
Conceptually, one conducts Information Operations to prevent adversaries from freely using information to achieve desired results while retaining the ability to use information and exploiting the adversary's information gap. Nation-states focus on imposing their will on other nation-states and non-governmental international players. 7 This is accomplished by applying all instruments of power available to the nationstate. The generally accepted categories are diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME). The dynamics of national instruments of power when viewed as a system have become increasingly interwoven and more complex. At the strategic level, the ability to control media sources is an excellent example.
Communist and totalitarian countries rely extensively on 10 to retain power and place their experts at the highest government levels.
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Joint
In 1996, General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed Joint Vision 2010 to "provide an operationally based template for the evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future". 9 The document is "front-end guidance for defense efforts to achieve future joint warfighting capabilities". 10 By applying dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics, the United States will achieve full spectrum dominance. A key aspect of full spectrum dominance is the emerging importance of information superiority. It states that information superiority will mitigate the impact of the friction and fog of war, advocates ensuring an uninterrupted flow of information and advocates non-traditional actions.
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Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, defines information operations as actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own 12 .
Information Operations are targeted to affect information dependent processes, whether the processes are human or automated. 13 Information operations are split into offensive 10 and defensive IO. Defensive IO is conducted continuously across the spectrum of peace, crisis and conflict. Offensive IO is information warfare by another name.
At the strategic level, the NCA directs the activities to achieve the national objectives. There is a great amount of cooperation at the interagency level. At the operational level, IO focus on affecting the adversary's lines of communication, his ability to command and control his resources and his ability to collect intelligence. However, the operational level is increasingly playing a critical role in the development and execution of the national policies in peacetime, crisis and war. Examples of this range from CINCs developing their theater engagement plan, reporting directly to congressional committees, and holding press conferences with coalition partners. Upon direction from the National Command Authority, the operational level is directed to affect the strategic level of another nation-state. The Gulf war and
Kosovo are examples of this. In broad terms, it describes the desired effects of Information Operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.
Despite the title, AFDD 2-5 focuses only on information warfare. It does not address operations other than war. The general trend of the document is focused on the protection of Air Force information and denying the adversary his information during crisis and conflict.
USN
Naval warfare is centered on establishing control of sea-lanes. As sea lines of communication are vast, this involves a great deal of information to ensure resources are properly employed at the critical location and time. Modern naval warfare is extremely dependent upon centralized control of critical information to conduct its mission. By breaking the Japanese naval code during World War II identifying Midway as the target for the next invasion, Admiral Nimitz was able to concentrate his outnumbered forces to foil the Japanese plan.
The United States Navy views information as the "lifeblood of any command and control system". 19 It is essential to ensure free flow of information to ensure effective command and control. To this end, the Navy places a great deal of priority on information protection. The Navy also recognizes this same vulnerability as an opportunity to exploit. It views information warfare as another tool for attacking adversaries and controlling sea lines of communication. Information Operations and Command and Control
Warfare are almost synonymous in the eyes of the Navy.
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To this end, the Navy has established the Fleet Information Warfare Activity in 1995 to support Information Operations throughout the Navy organization. It has always maintained a strong command and control warfare organization and has readily converted these to Information Operations units.
As the Navy is technically oriented, it expends a great deal of effort to research and resource information warfare. This is reflected in Admiral Owen's phrase "system of systems". It reflects the Navy view that its (and the nation's) adversaries are systems. As information is the blood pulsing through the system's veins, disrupting, denying or degrading the blood flow will cause the system to cease functioning properly.
This is manifested in the lack of written Navy Information Operations doctrine. While a firm believer in Information Operations, most of the Navy's written information resides in technical documents, posits, directives and classified sources. While most naval officers can describe their role in information operations, they cannot cite doctrinal references.
USMC
The United States Marine Corps published "A Concept for Information Operations" paper on 15 May 1998 to serve as a catalyst for discussion and research to focus on what Information Operations will be required by their concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea. It states "The Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope. Marine Corps information operations support maneuver warfare through actions to deny, degrade, disrupt, or destroy the enemy commander's ability to command and control his forces" .
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The concept covers the broad application of information operations at the operational and tactical levels to influence an enemy's power or achieve national objectives. It provides the basic framework of information operations for the marine air ground task force.
The Marine Corps is in a unique position. It must closely align itself with the defensive information operations conducted by the Navy to ensure interoperability requirements. It also must retain the flexibility and adaptability to conduct information operations independent of the Navy as well. These independent operations will probably closely resemble the Army's approach. 
IV. Systems Approach
In his book, In Pursuit of Military Excellence, Shimon Naveh applies the definition of a system to the operational level of warfare. The system, a complex of interacting elements, can be open to influences from its environment, or closed in which case no interaction takes place. The interaction of the system with its environment and among its parts is non-linear. It comprises three parameters: quantity, dominance of the system's aim, and quality. The quantitative parameter is the number of elements within the system.
The dominance of the aim focuses the system and how it functions. As Naveh states "It is the actual definition of the system's aim that indicates the focus of tension between the system and its rivals and the direction for releasing its internal stresses...it is the abstract exposition of the aim that provides the system with its unifying determinant. The acute importance of this cognitive unity derives both from the natural tendency of the elements to split from the system and from the fact that perpetuating cohesiveness within the system guarantees its self-regulating ability, which in turn, enables the system to overcome the turbulence of external disturbances... moving the system from a state of abstract, cognitive commonality to a practical course of positive progress can only be achieved by translating the overall aim into concrete objectives and missions for the system's individual components".
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The last parameter, qualitative, refers to the synergy created by the elements. This critical aspect is the effect of shock to the system. Shocking the adversary to degrade his ability to react to changing situations enables commanders to manipulate force ratios, timelines, and space to their advantage. Naveh's description of shock provides an excellent example of Information Operations when he states "Since operations constitute the consequence of the performance of military systems, which are goal-oriented in principle, it means depriving the rival system of its ability to attain its goal reflects the negative aspect of one's own aim. Moreover, separating the system from its brain and heart, both cognitively and physically, will inevitably lead to its disintegration and collapse" , 
V. Analysis
The evaluation criteria to analyze if joint and service Information Operations Doctrine is adequate are relevancy, jointness, sustainability, and force integration. After defining the terms of evaluation criteria, each will be applied in context to current doctrine by using Naveh's systems approach.
Relevancy
In relation to Information Operations doctrine, there are three critical measures of relevancy. The first is timeliness, the second is application across the entire spectrum of conflict and the third is measures of effectiveness.
The Information Operations doctrine process is critically slow. While no reflection of Information
Operations itself, the current doctrine process is inflexible and untimely when dealing with the velocity of technology and the dynamic world situation. 31 Doctrine is "the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare". 
Jointness
Since the Department of Defense term of joint is limited to the activities of two or more services working together, the term synergy is more applicable for joint Information Operations. Joint Publication 3.0 defines synergy as "integrating and synchronizing operations in a manner that applies force form different dimensions to shock, disrupt and defeat opponents".
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Joint and service doctrine addresses synergy both directly and indirectly in broad terms but do not develop a cohesive process to achieve it. While part of this is due to the services developing their doctrine prior to the publishing of the first joint publication, it is also due to a difference by all involved in their approach to Because of the probability that United States Armed
Forces will continue to be employed as a member of coalitions. Information Operations doctrine must be explored at the multi-national and coalition levels. This is currently done on an ad hoc basis during crisis planning.
Currently, there is also a tension between the broad terms and guidance of Information Operations at the strategic and operational levels and the tactical actions 
Integration
To achieve synergistic effects, the Information Operations process must be integrated into the United
States Armed Forces system. Integration is defined as the act of blending into a functioning whole. 
Applying the Systems Approach
By using Naveh's systems approach, the interaction and effects of all the evaluation criteria can be exhibited.
The quantity parameter is provided by the agencies, units, personnel and functions required to perform The last parameter is the aim of the system. Given the difference of the joint and services approaches, the Information Operations aim stated at each level is subjected to interpretation based on what quantity is available, what quality the commander, his staff and planners place on it and the aim of what they want it to accomplish. Without the unifying aim, the system will naturally become many systems attempting to achieve the same ends but by different means.
VZ. Conclusions
Information 
Issues and Recommendations
The first issue is current doctrine does not clearly limit the magnitude and depth of Information 
Summary
Information Operations doctrine is challenging to write because of the rapidity of technology, it is difference every time it is employed, it means something different to each service and even within each service. Its complexity and ambiguity have enabled many to claim they understand it but, in reality, they only understand a portion of it.
Current doctrine does lay down a good framework and is adequate. However, it is first generation doctrine and must be improved upon. Every major operation undertaken since the Berlin Wall has had a major Information Operations Component. Joint and sister service doctrine must reflect the lessons learned and provide a clearer picture of Information Operations at all levels of war, in all situations and for all functions and components of Information Operations.
